AENA SACRIFICA LA SEGURIDAD PARA REDUCIR LOS RETRASOS

Las distancias de seguridad se establecen en función de la velocidad, la capacidad de reacción, los sistemas de control y comunicación y los procedimientos operativos.


De fácil comprensión para los responsables de la Dirección General de Tráfico, que nos inundan de mensajes sobre la maldad de las prisas y la bondad de mantener distancias de seguridad generosas entre los vehículos con el fin de evitar accidentes, y tan difícil de entender para los irresponsables de AENA, que son incapaces de asumir que la seguridad es lo primero y la sacrifican en el altar de su incompetencia; porque es su incompetencia la causa de los retrasos endémicos que sufren los aeropuertos españoles (excepto algunos, entre los que se encuentran Huesca, León, Ciudad Real y Castellón.)


Nos informa Lara Otero en el diario El País que AENA implantará las nuevas separaciones mínimas entre aviones que había anunciado en junio, a partir del próximo 22 de septiembre.


Las nuevas mínimas de separación serán de cinco millas en vez de las ocho actuales (9,26 kilómetros en vez de 14,82) para los vuelos en ruta y de tres millas en lugar de cinco para (5,56 kilómetros en lugar de 9,26) los aviones que se aproximen a los aeropuertos con carácter general, si bien en los de Madrid, Barcelona y Palma se permitirán 2,5 millas (4,63 kilómetros) de separación en determinados casos (siempre que esté operativo el radar de superficie) y solo en las últimas 10 millas.


Alega AENA que las nuevas mínimas de separación son las mismas que en otros países europeos como Francia, y que esta medida implica aumentar la capacidad del cielo español en un 15% de media, lo que redundará en menos retrasos. Esto sin duda incrementará la carga de trabajo de los controladores sin recibir ninguna formación porque, según AENA, no es necesario. Si esto es verdad entonces ¿por qué no lo hicieron antes?


¿Será esto como la promesa de equipararnos con Europa en precios mientras mantenemos unos salarios y pensiones tercermundistas?


Reducir las distancias mínimas de separación significa reducir los tiempos para evitar incidentes y accidentes. Un avión que vuela a 900 km/h tarda 7,4 segundos en recorrer una milla náutica, y uno que vuela a 500 km/h 13,3 segundos. Multipliquemos y tendremos el tiempo que tienen para reaccionar si se produce una pérdida de separación.


Recomendamos la lectura del debate de Aviación Digital sobre esta noticia y el artículo publicado también en Aviación Digital sobre los Factores que rigen la determinación de mínimas de separación de aeronaves, y que adjuntamos


Factores que rigen la determinación de mínimas de separación de aeronaves

1. GENERALIDADES 1.1. Antes de examinar los factores que deben considerarse en la formulación de criterios para la determinación de mínimas de separación de aeronaves, es necesario describir y definir determinados supuestos básicos en materia de control de tránsito aéreo que pueden tener una influencia importante en la cuestión.

1.1.1. El control de tránsito aéreo parte de la base de que la navegación de una aeronave se decide en la misma. Por lo general, el control de tránsito aéreo no se hace cargo de la navegación excepto en determinados casos en los que el controlador de tránsito aéreo puede conocer mejor los datos relativos a la posición de la aeronave que sus propios tripulantes.

A medida que el control de tránsito aéreo ha ido utilizando en mayor escala el radar terrestre, ha habido una apreciable tendencia a que los controladores se hagan cargo de algunos de los aspectos de la navegación.

En dichas operaciones las instrucciones de navegación (vectores) necesarias para iniciar y mantener la debida trayectoria de vuelo son determinadas y comunicadas por el personal de tierra del ATC (véase Libro Cuarto, Capítulo 10).

1.1.2. La determinación de las mínimas de separación de aeronaves se basa en la calidad de la información de que dispone el organismo encargado del control de tránsito aéreo. La determinación de la separación lateral se basará primordialmente en la precisión con que los pilotos puedan adherirse a una derrota asignada.

En muchos casos las mínimas de separación lateral se fijan en función de la anchura del espacio aéreo que pretende protegerse a lo largo de una ruta o aerovía determinadas. Dichas mínimas deben comunicarse a todo el personal ATC interesado.

1.1.3. El tiempo invertido en adoptar decisiones, en la coordinación y en la transmisión puede influir en la aplicación de las mínimas de separación longitudinal "en tiempo", no menos que la determinación de los criterios en que se basan dichas mínimas, especialmente cuando no existen las comunicaciones directas entre el piloto y el controlador.

Si bien factores tales como los retrasos en las comunicaciones, momento de la decisión y el tiempo empleado en la coordinación tienen todos su influencia en el proceso de control, la eficacia del control de tránsito aéreo y la determinación de la antelación necesaria para cursar las instrucciones de control a fin de asegurar el mantenimiento de la mínima observada, no son factores en que se basen los criterios de separación.

Además, los controladores de tránsito aéreo trabajan siempre con relaciones aproximadas y no esperan a que se produzcan las condiciones mínimas de separación entre aeronaves para adoptar sus medidas.


¿Qué riesgos supone reducir las mínimas de separación? En SKYbrary hay información detallada sobre la pérdida de separación y los riesgos asociados, y que mostramos.


Loss of separation

Source: www.skybrary.aero

Description

A defined loss of separation between airborne aircraft occurs whenever specified separation minima in controlled airspace are breached. Minimum separation standards for airspace are specified by ATS authorities, based on ICAO standards.

A loss of separation between aircraft which are responsible for their own separation by visual lookout is not subject to definition.

Usually, the occurrence of a 'near miss', termed an AIRPROX by ICAO, is defined only by the opinion of one or more of the parties involved, whereas Near Midair Collision (NMAC) is an AIRPROX that meets specified criteria.

Types of Loss of Separation

- Loss of separation may be either in a vertical or a horizontal plane, or both;
- Loss of separation between aircraft may be a consequence of a Level Bust;
- Loss of separation between aircraft may result in encounters with Wake Vortex Turbulence;
- Loss of separation from restricted airspace is dealt with under Airspace Infringement;
- Loss of separation from the ground is dealt with under CFIT.
(Loss of separation between aircraft on the ground is dealt with under Ground Operations)

RVSM If the required equipment is carried as prescribed, then the risk of loss of separation in RVSM airspace is no greater (and no less) than in non-RVSM airspace.

Effects

- Loss of separation from other aircraft may result in collision;
- Injury, especially to unsecured cabin crew or passengers, may result from violent manoeuvres to avoid collision with other aircraft;
- Injury to aircraft occupants may also result from a wake vortex turbulence encounter.

Defences

- Pilot situational awareness of the location and intent of other aircraft gained from listening to radio traffic, visual identification and monitoring and ACAS, especially when not in receipt of a ATS radar or procedural control or when operating outside controlled airspace;
- Standard Operating Procedures, both on the flight deck and in the ATSU, which detail procedures to be followed to reduce the risk of loss of separation;
- Aircraft onboard equipment which warns of potential collision with other aircraft (ACAS) and allows an appropriate procedural response to risk. However, note that not all aircraft are required to be fitted with ACAS - only civil turbine-powered aircraft having a maximum certified takeoff mass in excess of 5,700 kg, or a maximum approved passenger seating configuration of more than 19.(ICAO Annex 6 Part I Chapter 6 Para 6.18 and EU-OPS 1.668);
- Ground-based equipment designed to warn of potential collision with other aircraft (STCA).
- Ground-based equipment designed to warn of potential conflict between aircraft in flight (MTCD).

Typical Scenarios

ATCO-induced situations: flight clearance does not provide adequate separation from other traffic:

- Controller is aware but makes a misjudgement.
- Controller is unaware.
- A trainee Controller is being mentored and the mentor fails to intervene appropriately when the trainee allows a potentially hazardous situation to develop
- Failure in sector or unit co-ordination

Pilot-induced situations: Flight in controlled airspace (CAS) deviates from cleared track or level without clearance due to flight crew:

- Inattention to equipment malfunction;
- Mis-setting of aircraft equipment;
- Mis management of FMS inputs;
- Failure to follow ATC clearance;
- Avoiding a perceived (visual) loss of separation with another aircraft;
- Avoiding weather perceived as potentially hazardous when unable to make timely contact with ATC on a busy frequency;
- Failure to properly follow a TCAS RA, including failure to terminate the deviation in a prompt manner when the RA ceases which may lead to a 'chain reaction' causing secondary TCAS RAs for aircraft in the same vicinity at adjacent levels;
- Ineffective visual "look out" when operating VFR;
- Not flying instructed or expected speeds or rates of climb and descent which have been the basis of a controllers flight sequence management;
- Allows their aircraft to enter CAS without ATC clearance

Any of the above scenarios is exacerbated by high traffic density or a rapidly changing traffic situation and many can also lead to inadequate separation outside controlled airspace associated, for example, with military fast jet low flying. Entry to an ATZ outside CAS without clearance has also caused many losses of adequate separation.

Contributory Factors

- Lack of appreciation by IFR pilots of the absence of Separation Standards against VFR traffic within some classes of airspace
- Volume of traffic/Traffic density.
- Weather (e.g. convective activity or cleat air turbulence (CAT));
- Aircraft performance (e.g. high or low rate of climb or descent)
- Proximity of military operational or training areas.
- Flight outside Controlled Airspace

Solutions

- Encourage or mandate the use of high quality communication systems, Transponders (Mode C and Mode S) and ACAS;
- Improve standard of pilot and ATCO training, especially in:
- Air-ground communication safety;
- Loss of separation awareness;
- Crew resource management;
- Provide more and improved ATC safety nets, e.g. STCA.
- Safety Nets must be set up so as to generate low levels of Nuisance alerts whilst providing useful warning time.

Related Articles and Further Reading sections were not included but are available in the SKYbrary article.


Especialmente dedicado al Sr. Ministro de Fomento, al Director de Aviación Civil, a la Directora de la AESA y al Presidente de AENA, por la decisión, no incorrecta, sino muy arriesgada, poco meditada, poco elaborada y nada consecuente, para que conozcan los riesgos los informes sobre incidentes y accidentes provocados por pérdida de separación. ¿Recordamos los jueguecitos que se trae entre manos AENA cada vez que saca a pasear el avión de calibración de los ILS?

Reports relating to accidents and incidents which involved Loss of Separation.

Y os animamos a leer el magnífico artículo Separación Radar publicado en Alas de Plomo, y el debate sobre el mismo en Aviación Digital.

TERCER ANIVERSARIO DEL ACCIDENTE DEL VUELO JK5022 EN EL AEROPUERTO DE MADRID-BARAJAS

Ante todo y ante todos nuestra solidaridad, apoyo y recuerdo con las víctimas del accidente del vuelo JK5022, sus familiares y amigos.

Todos los días son 20 de agosto de 2008, para las víctimas, sus familiares y amigos. Para los usuarios, trabajadores y vecinos del área de influencia del Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas, cualquier día podría ser, otra vez, 20 de agosto de 2008, porque tres años y un informe definitivo de la CIAIAC después todo permanece igual.

Lo triste, lamentable y terrorífico es que hoy, tres años después, si un avión tuviera los mismos problemas técnicos que el vuelo JK5022, volvería a no remontar el vuelo por ese viento de cola que la mayoría de las veces empuja a los aviones en su despegue, el avión caería al suelo y se despeñaría por el barranco y el arroyo que despiden a los que despegan por la pista 36L. Tres años después decenas, centenares o miles de vidas se romperían por la insidia y desidia de AENA, la Dirección General de Aviación Civil (DGAC) y la Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (AESA).

Señor Ministro de Fomento, ¿se refería usted a esto cuando afirmó que Barajas no es seguro?

Algo tan humano como la negación de la evidencia, lo incómodo que resulta la consciencia de convivir con el riesgo y en consecuencia despreciarlo, como si el desprecio de su existencia fuera la solución, nos impide ver que a día de hoy el gestor aeroportuario, la todavía empresa pública AENA, está jugando con la vida de millones de personas, con la aquiescencia y complicidad, en el estricto sentido criminal de la palabra, de la Dirección General de Aviación Civil (DGAC) y la Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (AESA).

Reproducimos las palabras escritas hace un año y cuya vigencia permanece:

Si esta comisión (la Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Incidentes de Aviación Civil, CIAIAC) tiene como fin último la prevención de futuros accidentes e incidentes, podemos aseverar que ha fallado en su cometido, porque, dos años después, en los resultados de su investigación, suponiendo que merece tal nombre, no ha presentado unas conclusiones y unas recomendaciones convincentes en materia de seguridad y a día de hoy un incidente de las mismas características tendría las mismas consecuencias: un avión que no podría remontar el vuelo y un final trágico en el fondo de un barranco abrupto. Y esto es motivo de escarnio y dolor para muchos.

Y no hablamos de las culpas y responsabilidades que ya las determinarán los jueces, aunque la realidad es que los responsables y culpables siguen en libertad y ocupando los mismos cargos, en la Dirección General de Aviación Civil, en la AESA, en AENA, o en despachos lejanos. Y esto es motivo de escarnio y dolor para muchos.

Tres años después, 154 familias rotas y millones de españoles nos preguntamos las razones de una tragedia que pudo evitarse, porque la red salvadora que en Lanzarote evitó el mismo accidente no estaba puesta en Barajas. Esa red, la seguridad en la operación en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Madrid-Barajas, yace bajo los 7.000 millones que nos costó a todos los españoles la indecente obra de ampliación. Y esto es motivo de escarnio y dolor para muchos.

Tres años después, todo sigue igual para que la tragedia se repita multiplicada por mil.

Tres años después estas preguntas siguen sin contestación por parte de la CIAIAC, la DGAC, la AESA o AENA; y es así porque sus responsables son parte de la respuesta.

¿Por qué en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas se obliga a los aviones a despegar con el viento de cola independientemente de su intensidad y la configuración operativa?

¿Por qué al final de las pistas de despegue se han eliminado las zonas de protección de fin de pista, y en el caso de la 36L hay un barranco y un arroyo?

¿Por qué la DGAC y la AESA se han cargado el cuerpo de inspectores del Estado con una persecución al más puro estilo de purga estalinista y en su lugar realizan las inspecciones “Técnicos Expertos” de la empresa SENASA, que siguen cobrando de las mismas compañías a las que inspeccionan, sin habilitación, sin formación, sin capacidad, sin autoridad y sin potestad para ello?

TERCER INFORME INTERINO DEL ACCIDENTE DEL AF447

Adjuntamos el tercer informe interino emitido por la BEA el pasado 29 de julio de 2011 en el que se recogen los últimos datos de la investigación del accidente del Airbus A-330 vuelo AF447, con origen en Río de Janeiro y destino en París-Charles de Gaulle.


En el siguiente enlace están disponibles los informes y notas de prensa emitidos por la BEA sobre el accidente del vuelo AF447.


Así mismo adjuntamos el resumen publicado en SKYbrary.


A332, en-route, Atlantic Ocean, 2009 (LOC HF AW WX

Description

On 1 June 2009, an Airbus A330-220 being operated by Air France on a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris CDG at night and in IMC exited controlled flight and crashed into the sea with the loss of the aircraft and all 228 occupants.

Investigation

The Accident occurred over International Waters and is subject to Investigation by the French BEA as State of the Operator and State of the Manufacturer. Although some floating wreckage was discovered early in the extensive sea search which followed the disappearance of the aircraft, progress in the investigation was severely handicapped by inability to locate the remaining wreckage on the seabed and retrieve especially the FDR and CVR. Indications that erroneous airspeed indications had occurred were obtained from ACARS maintenance messages transmitted automatically at the time. The aircraft had not been in R/T communication with any ATC Unit at the time of loss and other aircraft in the vicinity heard no distress or other transmissions.

An Initial Interim Report was issued on 2 July 2009 and a second one on 17 December 2009.

After an extensive and carefully planned series of undersea searches, for which comprehensive details have been documented and published on the BEA website in English, the wreckage was found on the seabed at a depth of 3,900 m on 3 April 2011 in a position 6.5 nm north-north-east of the last position transmitted by the aircraft. Both the FDR and CVR were subsequently located and retrieved and despite the long period underwater, replay of both was successful. Some key findings were disclosed in a ‘Note’ published on 27 May 2011.

On 29 July 2011, the BEA published a Third Interim Report in the French language with the English translation following on 4 August. This Report contains full factual details and analysis based upon the data from the FDR and CVR and a review of the applicable Air France flight crew procedures and flight training. The ten Safety Recommendations made are reproduced verbatim near the end of this article.

The overall factual conclusion is that after a brief failure of two of the three airspeed indications whilst in the cruise which caused the autopilot to disconnect, the inappropriate response of the pilots put the aircraft into an aerodynamic stall from which, due to their confused state at the situation created, they did not take action to recover, so that the aircraft descended at a high rate out of control and impacted the sea surface. The BEA note that as the aircraft descended fully stalled, the stall warning "sounded uninterruptedly for 54 seconds...without provoking any appropriate reaction from the crew."

A short summary of the event sequence is presented below. It should be noted that, in common with most current civil aircraft types, there was no display of the angle of attack on the flight deck of the accident aircraft, although as always, this was tracked and used to provide stall warning and flight envelope protection which, when operative, makes it impossible to stall the aircraft.

At the time the sequence of events which led to the loss of the aircraft began, the aircraft commander, who had been operating as PM, had just commenced a routine rest period and his role and place in the left hand had been taken by the second First Officer. The other First Officer in the right hand seat remained as PF.

It was noted that “the Captain’s departure occurred without clear operational instructions” and that “there was no explicit task-sharing between the two co-pilots”.

Prior to the events which led to the eventual loss of the aircraft, all was proceeding routinely with the aircraft at FL350 and maintaining a speed of Mach 0.82 and a normal pitch attitude of about 2.5°.

On the basis of weather radar returns, the two First Officers decided to make a change of course to the left of 12°.

About two minutes later, while the aircraft was flying “at the upper limit of a slightly turbulent cloud layer”, “the autopilot then the auto thrust disengaged”.

This occurred because, in quick succession, two of the three airspeed indications, those on the left hand PFD and those on the ISIS (the Integrated Standby Instrument), failed. This is considered by the investigators to have been “a result of the obstruction of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment”.

Since the A330 is a Fly-By-Wire aircraft, a secondary effect of this was that the prevailing Control Law changed from 'Normal' to 'Alternate' which had the effect of removing automatic Flight Envelope Protection. Crew awareness of the change is confirmed by CVR recording of the PM acknowledging ‘alternate law protections’.

The immediate response of the PF was to make a significant nose-up input which led to the stall warning being triggered twice in a row. The Investigation notes that at the prevailing cruise speed and altitude, "the margin between the flight angle of attack and the angle of attack (at which) the stall warning (will be activated) is of the order of 1.5 degrees, but the stall warning speed displayed on the air speed tape (in alternate or direct law) will be around 40 kt below the actual speed".

In the presence of some roll instability, the pitch attitude of the aircraft “increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane started to climb” with the vertical speed reaching 7000 fpm. There were no recorded comments from either pilot about this.

“The PF then made nose down inputs alternately to the right and to the left. The climb speed…..dropped to 700 ft/min” and the speed indications on the left PFD returned after an absence of 29 seconds showing Mach 0.68. “The airplane was then at an altitude of about 37,500 ft and the recorded angle of attack was around 4 degrees”

From this point, about 45 seconds after the disconnection of the autopilot, the PM made several attempts to call the Captain back to the flight deck.

39 seconds after the autopilot disconnection “…the stall warning triggered again. The thrust levers were placed in the TO/GA detent and the PF maintained his nose-up input. The recorded angle of attack, of the order of 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning, continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabiliser (THS) began moving and passed from 3 to 13 degrees nose-up in about 1 minute; it remained in this position until the end of the flight.” It is noted that these and subsequent THS movements were valid responses to pilot control inputs.

The Investigation notes that the approach to a fully stalled condition as a result of the pitch inputs of PF was correctly characterised by the triggering of the warning and then the appearance of buffet. A short time after the stall warning activated, the PF applied TO/GA thrust. It was noted that none of the pilots had made any reference to the stall warning or formally identified the stall situation.

In less than one minute after the disconnection of the autopilot, the aircraft became fully stalled and exited the AFM Flight Envelope as a result of the actions of the PF.

Until this happened, the aircraft longitudinal movements had been consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces.

Fifteen seconds after the continuous stall warning began, and after a failure lasting 54 seconds, the ISIS speed display returned and thereafter indicated the same as the other displayed speeds.

“The PF continued to make nose-up inputs. The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft; its pitch attitude and its angle of attack were 16 degrees.”

At 51 seconds after the stall warning began (and 1 minute 30 seconds after the autopilot disconnection), the aircraft commander re-entered the flight deck and “in the following seconds, all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall warning stopped. This was because. if the angle of attack values become invalid, which they do by design below 60 kt CAS the stall warning becomes inoperative. This occurs because the airflow at the angle of attack sensors must be sufficient to ensure a valid measurement can be generated.

For the remainder of the flight, it was found that each time the stall warning had been intermittently triggered, the angle of attack had exceeded its theoretical trigger value.

The aircraft began to descend fully stalled. With the altitude "around 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the vertical speed was around 10 000 ft/min. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees and the engine N1 was close to 100%. The airplane was subject to roll oscillations that sometimes reached 40 degrees. The PF made a nose-up left input on the sidestick to the stop that lasted around 30 seconds.”

20 seconds after the Captain had re-entered the flight deck, the thrust levers were reduced to Flight Idle. As the aircraft continued to descend in a fully stalled condition, “the angle of attack, when it was valid, always remained above 35 degrees”

All recordings ceased 2 minutes 46 seconds after the Captain had re-entered the flight deck with a “pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up”

In beginning to examine the context for what happened and continuing to bear in mind the delays to the Investigation caused by the time taken to recover the data recorders, the Investigation:

Found that the PF had been an Air France pilot since 2004 and had been qualified on the Airbus A330 for six months. The PM had been an Air France pilot since 1999 and qualified on the Airbus A330 since 2002. It was noted that recent pilot training for "Unreliable IAS" had been carried out using a scenario just after take off, with circumstances which did not correspond to many of those which applied when the IAS displays temporarily failed on the accident flight. In addition, it was also noted that "the copilots had not been trained for manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude" and that "no training was provided on the operation of the aircraft with two co pilots".

Concluded that a recording of the instrument panel to compliment the information provided by the FDR and the CVR would be useful because it would make it possible to confirm the indications that had been available to a flight crew as well as their actions, whether or not these produced recorded evidence. It is also considered that the present requirement to record only flight parameters displayed on the left hand side instrument panel was potentially unhelpful and that functional analysis of many complex systems on modern aircraft is “limited and delayed by the absence of a recording of all of the data sources that they use”.

Noted in respect of the airborne transmission of flight data, that “it is technically feasible to define reliable criteria based on flight parameters allowing emergency situations to be detected while limiting false alarms and it is technically feasible to obtain an impact position with enough precision, even in accidents where the airplane is in an unusual position”. It also noted that “in-flight activation of next generation emergency locator transmitters (ELT) using the same emergency detection criteria is feasible.”

Safety Recommendations

Six Recommendations relating to the task of accident investigation were included in the Second Interim Report, four in respect of flight recorders and two more in respect of aircraft certification:

- That EASA and ICAO extend as rapidly as possible to 90 days the regulatory transmission time for ULB’s installed on flight recorders on airplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas'

- That EASA and ICAO make it mandatory, as rapidly as possible, for airplanes performing public transport flights over maritime areas to be equipped with an additional ULB capable of transmitting on a frequency (for example between 8.5 kHz and 9.5 kHz) and for a duration adapted to the pre-localisation of wreckage;

- That EASA and ICAO study the possibility of making it mandatory for airplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading).

- That ICAO ask the FLIRECP group to establish proposals on the conditions for implementing deployable recorders of the EUROCAE ED-112 type for airplanes performing public transport flights.

- That EASA undertake studies to determine with appropriate precision the composition of cloud masses at high altitude

- That EASA, in coordination with the other regulatory authorities, based on the results obtained, modify the certification criteria (in respect of the effects of cloud masses at high altitude)

The Third Interim Report contains ten further Recommendations, three relating to pilot training and procedures following an examination of those in place at Air France, one in respect of data presentation to the pilots and six more concerning accident investigation issues:

- That EASA review the content of check and training programmes and make mandatory, in particular, the setting up of specific and regular exercises dedicated to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at high altitude.

- That EASA define additional criteria for access to the role of relief Captain so as to ensure better task-sharing in case of relief crews.

- That, provisionally, the DGAC define additional criteria for access to the role of relief Captain so as to ensure better task-sharing in case of relief crews.

- That EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board airplanes.

- That ICAO require that aircraft undertaking public transport flights with passengers be equipped with an image recorder that makes it possible to observe the whole of the instrument panel.

- That at the same time, ICAO establish very strict rules for the readout of such (image) recordings in order to guarantee the confidentiality of the recordings.

- That EASA and the FAA make mandatory the recording of:
the position of the flight director crossbars,
the parameters relating to the conduct of the flight displayed on the right side, in addition to those displayed on the left side.

- That EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of making mandatory the recording of the air data and inertial parameters of all of the sources used by the systems.

- That EASA and ICAO make mandatory as quickly as possible, for airplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, triggering of data transmission to facilitate localisation as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board;

- That EASA and ICAO study the possibility of making mandatory, for airplanes making public transport flights with passengers over maritime or remote areas, the activation of the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), as soon as an emergency situation is detected on board

During the presentation of the Third Interim Report, the BEA advised that the remainder of the Investigation will focus particularly on the Human Factors aspects of the accident and that a new Working Group within the investigation has been established to progress this whilst the already-existing Airplane Systems Working Group progresses the pitot icing issue.

The BEA stated on 3 August that the Final Report of the Investigation is expected to be published during the first half of 2012.