BARAJAS: OVERLIT, OVERHEATED, UNDERUSED, UNDERWHELMING

Channel 4 es una cadena de televisión privada del Reino Unido fundada en 1982, al amparo de la Ley Audiovisual de 1980, con el objetivo de romper el duopolio de la BBC, con BBC1 y BBC2, e ITV (Independent Television). A pesar de ser un canal completamente privado, posee un estatus de carácter público por lo que ha de cumplir una serie de obligaciones, entre otras la de responder ante la Ofcom (Independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries). Channel 4, con un importante porcentaje de audiencia, tiene cobertura en todo el territorio del Reino Unido y presencia en países vecinos, como Irlanda, además de emitir vía satélite para otros países. (Fuentes: Wikipedia y Channel 4).



Alex Thomson es presentador de televisión y el corresponsal jefe de Channel 4 News. Anteriormente trabajó para la BBC, radio y televisión, en Irlanda del Norte. Además ha escrito varios libros sobre la India y la guerra del Golfo y colabora como columnista con la Press Gazette.

Durante 22 años ha cubierto informativamente más de 20 conflictos armados, entre otros la Guerra del Golfo, los Balcanes, varias guerras en África y Afganistán. Además ha dirigido programas especiales sobre acontecimientos históricos recientes, entre ellos uno sobre el Domingo Sangriento que le valió el premio de la Royal Television Society en 1997.

En resumen, estamos hablando de uno de los medios informativos más importantes del Reino Unido y de unos de los profesionales con más prestigio y reputación, ganados a pulso e incluso poniendo en riesgo su vida, dentro del periodismo de investigación. Además por lo que hemos leído de él y sobre él, se trata de un profesional independiente y con criterio. Otra cosa es que estemos o no de acuerdo con sus ideas.

El pasado 29 de septiembre, Alex Thomson, escribió el siguiente artículo sobre el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas. Breve, conciso y demoledor. Paradigma de un país que durante años se ha dedicado a construir infraestructuras innecesarias con el único afán de alimentar el ego de unos políticos acomplejados e irresponsables. Aeropuertos sin aviones, carreteras y autopistas sin coches, estaciones de AVE sin pasajeros, impresionantes museos y megacomplejos de ocio sin visitantes, y macrourbanizaciones sin residentes. En resumen, decenas de miles de millones de euros que ahora nadie saben donde están en su totalidad. Empresas en quiebra y administraciones públicas en la ruina por tener que asumir las ensoñaciones faraónicas de unos dirigentes corruptos e irresponsables. Y lo peor de todo es que no hay propósito de enmienda y seguimos por el mismo camino, el que ahora nos quieren marcar un tal Adelson con Eurovegas y una panda de iluminados con el proyecto de la ciudad financiera Eurochina.

¿Acaso nos creemos que el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas es de los mejores? Cuando quien lo describe no recibe sueldo, compensación o sobre de AENA o adláteres, entonces nos encontramos con la cruda realidad.

Saturday 29 Sep 2012

Barajas: overlit, overheated, underused, underwhelming

No more can you judge a city by its airport, than a book by its cover.



But perhaps you can judge a Eurocrisis by an airport and if so, Barajas, is surely where you’d start.

And judgment commences even before landing at Madrid’s absurd, bloated monstrosity – designed by Britain’s Richard Rogers.

From the air the still sun-parched high Spanish plateau is crisscrossed by empty, unfinished motorways, slip roads reaching out in hope across the dun terrain, only to end abruptly, nowhere.

Ghost highways take nobody to half-built groups of highrise flats. Around them, mantis-like, tall, silent, motionless cranes do nothing at all. Clumps of empty apartment blocks where the builders clocked off months and sometimes years ago.

Concrete apron

Barajas Airport itself, one giant folly to Euro-borrowing on a grand scale against a dream that has never come true. Quite probably never could.

The concrete apron so vast it is impossible to see the end of it at some points.

Arriving means a long bus journey over the concrete plain to a terminal so over-lit and underused it feels unreal. Passengers face a major hike however they come, long concourses merely bring you to several escalators up or down. They in turn will only deposit you at a transit train.

An ode to inefficiency

Then its a journey by train – perhaps a mile or more – and a two-way underground track, to another terminal. More long walks. More escalators. Lifts. More signs. Walk. And walk. Escalators again. Walk.

Then a colossal baggage reclaim area which alone would engulf a Heathrow terminal. I counted 18 carousels. Eighteen. You could fit several football pitches in here.



Waste of space

Overlit, overheated, underused, underwhelmed. And inefficient: the baggage has so far to come you’ve inevitably now got a long wait in this vast, empty place where the wasting of space on a massive scale appears to have been the central stipulation of the design brief.

Sound like I’m moaning?

Not a bit. I’m fascinated. In a country facing an almost inevitable bail-out for living beyond any notion of economic reality all this is a gift for any visiting reporter.

And they tell me on Twitter there are any number of equally pointless airports across Spain: Ciudad Real, Malaga, Castillon – all making wonderful architectural statements (whilst actually being punishment centres for human self-loading cargo).

No, you cannot judge a book by its cover but you can see the broken dream of the Euro in the gleaming ghost carousels of Barajas.

Esto es lo que piensan fuera de nuestro Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas, orgullo de la AENA de los miles de millones de euros de deuda y herencia de unos gobiernos que ni supieron ni quisieron conjugar el verbo que más quebraderos de cabeza y bolsillo ahorra: planificar. Y quizá ahora lo empezamos a ver claro: ya que el ministro de Fomento responsable era el mejor amigo del personaje que maneja los hilos de la marioneta en la que se ha convertido todo un presidente del gobierno y séquito presente y pasado, y el ministro de economía, el mejor proclamaban, acusado e imputado por robar y engañar. Si encima supieran que la operación en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas es insegura…

VICTORIA EN VITERBO (A VITERBO HA VINTO LA LOTTA DELLE PERSONE ONESTE)

Reproducimos la carta que el 28 de diciembre pasado hizo pública el Comitato che si oppone al mega-aeroporto di Viterbo e s'impegna per la riduzione del trasporto aereo, in difesa della salute, dell'ambiente, della democrazia, dei diritti di tutti.

Los planes para construir el megaaeropuerto deViterbo a 40 kilómetros de Roma han sido finalmente descartados. Felicitamos a todos los luchadores implicados, futuros afectados que ya no lo serán y ciudadanos italianos en general. Nos felicitamos porque en esta Europa mediterránea, que algunos consideran decadente, hay espacio para el sentido común y la rectificación.

La base aérea militar de Viterbo, cerca de la pequeña Viterbo, señalada en 2007 por el Ministerio de Transportes italiano para albergar el nuevo y gigante aeropuerto de Roma, y así aliviar el tráfico de los existentes de Ciampino y Fiumicino, ha pasado a ser un mal sueño. Una pesadilla de la que han despertado los italianos. Y esto no habría sido posible si no es por los contundentes argumentos de reputados científicos, jueces, profesores de varias universidades y la acción conjunta y decidida de grupos ecologistas, vecinales y de defensa de los derechos humanos, en contra de este monstruo de cemento y acero, que iba a barrer del mapa una zona de alto valor ecológico y arqueológico.

Mucho, muchísimo tienen que aprender las asociaciones en contra del ruido de España.

Nella conferenza-stampa di fine anno il sindaco di Viterbo ha dovuto finalmente ammettere che il mega-aeroporto non si fara'.

E' stata definitivamente sconfitta la lobby affaristica e vandalica di estrema destra (cui si prostitui' gran parte dell'insipiente ed irresponsabile ceto politico locale) che dal 2007 ha condotto una scellerata e forsennata azione per tentare di imporre a Viterbo un nocivo e distruttivo, illegale e insensato mega-aeroporto.

Ha vinto la lotta delle persone oneste

Ha definitivamente vinto la lotta delle persone oneste che dal 2007 hanno denunciato l'illegalita' e la follia della realizzazione di un mega-aeroporto nocivo e distruttivo nel cuore della preziosa area naturalistica, archeologica e termale del Bulicame; ha definitivamente vinto la lotta delle persone oneste che dal 2007 si sono battute contro l'illegale ed insensato mega-aeroporto di Viterbo e per la riduzione del trasporto aereo, in difesa della salute, dell'ambiente, della democrazia, dei diritti di tutti.

Il Bulicame salvato

La realizzazione del mega-aeroporto nel cuore della preziosa area naturalistica, archeologica e termale del Bullicame, di cui fece memoria Dante (che usava la grafia con una sola elle: "Bulicame") nella Divina Commedia, avrebbe avuto come inevitabili immediate e disastrose conseguenze:

a) lo scempio dell'area del Bulicame e dei beni ambientali e culturali che vi si trovano;

b) la devastazione dell'agricoltura della zona circostante;

c) l'impedimento alla valorizzazione terapeutica e sociale delle risorse termali;

d) un pesantissimo inquinamento chimico, acustico ed elettromagnetico di grave nocumento per la salute e la qualita' della vita della popolazione locale (l'area e' peraltro nei pressi di popolosi quartieri della citta');

e) il collasso della rete infrastrutturale dell'Alto Lazio, territorio gia' gravato da pesanti servitu';

f) uno sperpero colossale di soldi pubblici;

g) una flagrante violazione di leggi italiane ed europee e dei vincoli di salvaguardia presenti nel territorio.

L'area del Bullicame va invece tutelata nel modo piu' adeguato: istituendovi un parco naturalistico, archeologico e termale; e fin d'ora respingendo ogni operazione speculativa, inquinante, devastatrice, illecita.

E nell'ambito della mobilita' la provincia di Viterbo ha bisogno piuttosto di migliorare la rete ferroviaria ed i collegamenti con Roma, Orte e Civitavecchia; una mobilita' adeguata e coerente con la difesa e la valorizzazione dei beni ambientali e culturali e delle vocazioni produttive dell'Alto Lazio.

Continuare nell'impegno per ridurre il trasporto aereo

E' necessario non incrementare, ma ridurre il trasporto aereo.

1. Un aeroporto provoca gravi danni alla salute della popolazione che vive nei dintorni: sia attraverso l'inquinamento dell'aria, che causa gravi patologie, sia attraverso l'inquinamento acustico.

2. Il trasporto aereo provoca gravissimi danni al clima: contribuisce enormemente al surriscaldamento del pianeta.

3. Il trasporto aereo danneggia gravemente l'ambiente: sia a livello globale, sia a livello locale.

4. Il trasporto aereo e' antieconomico: consuma piu' energia di ogni altro mezzo di trasporto; danneggia gravemente la biosfera; costa molto alla comunita' poiche' e' fortemente sovvenzionato sia da finanziamenti pubblici sia da esenzioni ed agevolazioni fiscali (mentre si effettuano sciagurati tagli di bilancio per sanita' ed assistenza): paradossalmente la maggior parte dei costi del trasporto aereo li pagano i cittadini che non lo usano; danneggiando l'ambiente e sottraendo risorse pubbliche non aiuta le economie locali ma le impoverisce; l'occupazione nel settore e' limitata, spesso precaria, e le compagnie hanno spesso condotte gravemente antisindacali.

5. Il trasporto aereo e' iniquo: statisticamente e' dimostrato che e' soprattutto un privilegio dei ricchi; ma i costi li pagano soprattutto i bilanci pubblici, usando i fondi della fiscalita' generale ricavati cioe' dalla tassazione di tutti i cittadini: chi paga le tasse e' costretto, a sua insaputa e contro la sua volonta', a finanziare le compagnie aeree (le quali invece le tasse le pagano ben poco, godendo di agevolazioni e addirittura di esenzioni incredibili); le nocive conseguenze del trasporto aereo le pagano innanzitutto i poveri.

6. Il trasporto aereo non e' sicuro: di tutte le modalita' di trasporto e' la piu' pericolosa, per i viaggiatori e per chi vive nelle aree sorvolate.
Solidali coi cittadini di Ciampino e Fiumicino

Continua il nostro impegno di solidarieta' con i comitati ed i cittadini di Ciampino e di Fiumicino, per la drastica riduzione del trasporto aereo e contro ogni ampliamento di sedimi aeroportuali.

Il comitato che si oppone al mega-aeroporto di Viterbo e s'impegna per la riduzione del trasporto aereo, in difesa della salute, dell'ambiente, della democrazia, dei diritti di tutti

Viterbo, 28 dicembre 2012

Mittente: "Comitato che si oppone al mega-aeroporto di Viterbo e s'impegna per la riduzione del trasporto aereo, in difesa della salute, dell'ambiente, della democrazia, dei diritti di tutti", recapito postale: c/o Centro di ricerca per la pace e i diritti umani, strada S. Barbara 9/E, 01100 Viterbo, e-mail: info@coipiediperterra.org, sito: www.coipiediperterra.org

Y adjuntamos, en inglés, el dramático llamamiento que realizaron en agosto de 2011 a todo el mundo de la cultura y la educación el Profesor Osvaldo Ercoli, Dr. Antonella Litta, Dr. Emanuele Petriglia y el Profesor Alessandro Pizzi en nombre del comité en contra del aeropuerto de Viterbo por la reducción del transporte aéreo y en defensa de la salud, el medio ambiente, la democracia y los derechos humanos. Para consultar la carta en italiano pulsar aquí.

This is an appeal published in August 2011

An appeal to the world of culture and education:

Ladies and gentlemen, we turn to you, people who love the culture to the point of having made the call and the professional commitment of your life, asking for your urgent help. The archaeological area and spa Bulicame in Viterbo, an area of emergencies and valuable historical memories and cultural and natural heritage and resources less valuable therapeutic, and threatened with destruction by the will of a lobby speculative-fulfillment of a mega-airport.

The realization of the mega-airport would have the immediate consequences:

a) the destruction of the area Bulicame and environmental and cultural heritage found there;

b) to the devastation of agriculture of the surrounding area;

c) the ground for therapeutic exploitation of thermal resources, and social;

d) a heavy chemical pollution, noise and electromagnetic will be ‘serious harm to the health and quality’ of life of local people (and the area ‘also near the populous districts of the city’);

e) the collapse of the infrastructure network of Lazio, the territory already ‘weighed down by heavy servitude’;

f) a colossal waste of public money;

g) a flagrant violation of laws and constraints of the Italian and European safeguard the territory.

Certain irresponsible promoters of this senseless attack have announced that the Interministerial Committee for Economic Programming (acronym: CIPE) is about to finance the mega-airport, despite its blatant illegality ‘.

We appeal to the entire world of culture and education ORDER ‘help us to prevent the irreversible destruction of the place you wanted to remember Dante’s Divine Comedy.

We ask you to join this call for ‘the government does not fund the destruction of the archaeological and spa Bulicame in Viterbo, not finance a mega-airport harmful and destructive, misguided and illegal.

Professor Osvaldo Ercoli
Dr. Antonella Litta
Dr. Emanuele Petriglia
Professor Alessandro Pizzi

for the committee who opposed the mega-airport of Viterbo and is committed to the reduction of air transport, in defense of health, environment, democracy, human rights all.

Coordination of Associations of Lazio for the Mobility Alternative

LECCIONES DESDE PHUKET, TAILANDIA

Adjuntamos el artículo de SKYbrary sobre el accidente de un MD-82 de One Two Go Airlines, con 130 tripulantes a bordo, ocurrido en el Aeropuerto de Phuket (Tailandia) el 16 de septiembre de 2007. La aeronave tras una aproximación fallida a la pista 27 no fue capaz de remontar y se estrelló contra el suelo dentro del perímetro del recinto aeroportuario, con un balance final de 90 muertos, 26 heridos graves y 14 leves.



Adjuntamos también la noticia publicada en El Mundo y un vídeo sobre el accidente.



MD82, Phuket Thailand, 2007 (LOC HF)

Source: www.skybrary.aero

Category: Accidents and Incidents

Description

On 16 September 2007, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 being operated by One Two Go Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Bangkok to Phuket attempted a missed approach from close to runway 27 in day VMC but only climbed briefly before a steep descent into the ground occurred within the airport perimeter. The impact and subsequent fire led to the destruction of the aircraft and to the deaths of 90 of the 130 occupants, serious injury to 26 others and minor injuries to the other 14.

Investigation

An Investigation was carried out by the AAIC of Thailand with significant assistance from the NTSB. The DFDR and CVR were recovered and successfully replayed and the non-volatile memory (NVM) from various equipment, including especially the EGPWS unit, also yielded important information.

It was established that the aircraft commander, an Indonesian National, had taken the role of PM for the flight with the First Officer, a much younger Thai National acting as PF. There was a very considerable disparity between the level of both the overall flying experience and the specific aircraft type experience of the two pilots. The First Officer, whilst having been operating on the MD82 for some time, had gained most if not all of his multi crew jet experience on the type.

It was established that the ILS approach in VMC had been made with the AP out but the A/T (autothrottle) engaged in conditions which clearly indicated that a temporary deterioration in the weather was imminent and which had included awareness of the preceding inbound aircraft reporting that there “was a Cb over the airport”. Nevertheless, the aircraft commander had allowed the First Officer to remain as PF and even when it became apparent that he was not able to achieve a stabilised approach as the wind velocity and variation increased, did not take control. Eventually, as the auto call out of 40 feet height occurred, an EGPWS Mode 1 Sink Rate Alert was annunciated and the First Officer called a go around. This was confirmed by the commander and the First Officer called for Flap 15 and manually pushed the thrust levers forward - but failed to set or call for TO/GA to be set - before ‘transferring control’ to the commander. Since the A/T was still engaged when the go around was called, retard mode had become active and since the DFDR showed that the thrust had returned to idle after the initial manual override by the First Officer, it was surmised that when control was passed to the commander without prior warning, the First Officer had removed his hand from the thrust levers and the commander was initially using both his hands on the control column. All other go around actions were completed including the necessary pitch up but at no subsequent stage was the TO/GA switch pressed. The aircraft reached a height of almost 300 feet aal before it ceased to climb as a consequence of lack of engine thrust. Further EGPWS alerts and a final PULL UP warning were found to have occurred in the descent shortly before impact, upon which a fire immediately broke out. Four minutes after the impact, the weather had deteriorated further to 800 metres visibility in heavy rain and conditions below landing minima. It was noted that the aircraft had been fitted with a reactive wind shear alerting system which it was established had been serviceable, but no activation of it had occurred until the final second prior to impact.

It was noted that there was no provision in the Operations Manual for a handover of control at the point of go around and considered that confusion about system status would have been exacerbated by this sudden and unplanned / unanticipated handover. It was considered that the aircraft commander could reasonably have taken control at a much earlier stage of the approach and/or called an earlier go around. The Investigation also noted general non compliance with SOPs by the accident aircraft flight crew (although no conflict between them) as well as considerable deficiencies in practices of the aircraft operator. It was also found that both accident flight crew had exceeded various elements of the applicable flight time limitations scheme, although no hard evidence that either was fatigued as a consequence of this in a way that affected the accident outcome was presented by the Investigation.

In respect of the Airport, the effective but non notified unserviceability of the LLWAS due to it being powered by solar cells which had run down after a period of cloudy weather was noted. Aspects of the emergency response were also considered unsatisfactory.

The Commission determined the Probable Causes of the Accident to be as follows:

• The flight crew did not follow the SOPs (for) Stabilised Approach, Call Out, Go Around and Emergency Situations as specified in the airline’s FOM
• The Take Off / Go Around (TO/GA) switch was not activated, resulting in the inability of the aircraft to increase in airspeed and altitude during the go around. Also, there was no monitoring of the change in engine power and movement of throttle levers, especially during the critical situation.
• The flight crew co-ordination was insufficient and the flight crew had heavy workloads.
• The weather condition changed suddenly over the airport vicinity
• The flight crew had accumulated stress, insufficient rest and fatigue
•The transfer of aircraft control took place at a critical moment during the go around

A total of 17 Safety Recommendations were issued as a result of the Investigation as follows:

• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish (a) Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) course, approved by the DCA, for all related personnel in every concerned section. The course should comprise of initial and recurrent training, having content according to ICAO requirements.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should strictly train flight crew according to the flight crew training course and flight procedures in SOP.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should amend the Operating Procedures on ‘Transfer of Control during Critical Phase of Flight’ in SOP to be most clear and definite.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should perform the pilot training check, as appointed by the DCA, to meet applicable standards, especially the pilot proficiency check.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should use a flight simulator that (can) simulate the systems, equipment and instruments of the aeroplane with the same configuration (that) the Airline operates.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should arrange the crew schedule, according to the requirements in Flight Time and Flight Duty Period Limitations, by establishing a checking system with advance warning function before exceeding the limitation. The system should also enable the flight crew to check their status.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk leading to any accident or incident and to improve the safety of flight operations to meet the required standards.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should direct all management levels to encourage personnel to have unique corporate culture in having values and beliefs to perform their jobs, in accordance with laws and regulations, and to report any wrongful misconduct (which) may (be) of use for improving task efficiency and increasing safety performance. This could be done through training and motivation.
• that the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should expedite the improvement of (the) runway strip to meet the Standard prescribed in Annex 14 of ICAO or revise the category of instrument approach procedure to suit the current runway strip. The Company shall also establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should construct more access roads across the ditch along runway 27 to inaccessible areas at Phuket International Airport to facilitate rescue and fire fighting team (access) to any accident area in due time. The Company should also arrange the rescue and fire fighting exercise in those areas in order to mitigate the difficulties in rescue and fire fighting.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should include the Emergency Medical Institute of Thailand (formerly Narenthorn Centre), which is the government institute that co-ordinate(s) and provide(s) medical emergency service, in the Airport Emergency Plan.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should perform a full scale emergency exercise which should cover the participation of all responsible sectors and personnel to comply with the Airport Emergency Plan in (the) most efficient way when an accident (occurs).
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should oversee the operation of One Two Go Airlines Company Limited….in order to improve their safety efficiency. The DCA should also issue regulations indicating the guidelines and practices of CRM training.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should improve the measure for regulating and overseeing the air operators under DCA supervision to achieve the most efficiency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Aero Thai Company Limited in order to specify operational guidelines (for) ‘Crash on Airport’ into (the) ‘Manual of Air Traffic Services. The guidelines should also be detailed in accordance with Doc 9137/An 898 Airport Service Manual, Part 7: Airport Emergency Planning, Chapter 4, Responsibility and Role of Each Type of Emergency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Meteorological Department to review all LLWAS installation(s) to identify possible deficiencies I performance, similar to those identified at Phuket International Airport and correct such deficiencies to ensure optimum performance of the LLWAS. Furthermore, the DCA should consider the installation of efficient LLWAS with advance system(s) to cover other airports, as considered necessary.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the following medical centres that perform post accident medical examinations on involved flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform physical examination on surviving post accident flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination by physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health and/or physicians from the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police arrive at the accident site first.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health.
o The Ministry of Public Health to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health arrive at the accident site first.
o The Ministry of Public Health to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.

The Final Report of the Investigation was published in June 2010.

Related articles and further readings were not included but are available in the skybrary article.

¿Cuáles serían las consecuencias de un accidente de estas características en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas?
Catastróficas. Lo vemos en los siguientes Riesgos de Barajas:

RIESGO 2

El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 33L en categorías ILS II y III, según operaciones publicadas en el AIP en la actualidad, es susceptible de impactar contra la terminal T4.

RIESGO 3

El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en ILS CATII y III, es susceptible de impactar contra la Torre de Control Norte que invade sus OAS de frustrada, al haberla ubicado a escasos 400 metros, cuando precisamente por este motivo la pista 33R se tuvo que desplazar y distanciar de la 33L 1900 metros, a fin de cumplir con la distancia legal de seguridad de 950 metros equidistantes que sí existen para la 33R y 33L.

RIESGO 4

Los embudos o espacios de Seguridad establecidos para los aterrizajes frustrados por las pistas 33R y 33L en categoría ILS II y III, que deberían permanecer libres de objetos para cumplir su función de seguridad, son sistemáticamente invadidos por las aeronaves que despegan desde las pistas 36R y 36L con el riesgo de colisión, precisamente por no cumplir la Normativa del Anexo 14 de OACI de operar en PISTAS PARALELAS O CASI PARALELAS. Esta situación es contemplada para cuando Barajas opera en configuración Norte y vuelve a reproducirse exactamente igual cuando se opera en configuración Sur.

RIESGO 5

El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en categorías ILS II y III está sujeto a riesgo de accidente provocado por una frustrada fallida (al igual que lo han previsto para la T4) por colisión contra los depósitos de combustible CLH, las terminales T1, T2 y T3 y el pueblo de Barajas, que se encuentran ubicados en la zona de seguridad (OFA extended) y dentro de la franja de protección de 3.500 metros recomendada por la Universidad de Cranfield.

Este accidente debería servir también de advertencia a todos aquellos que piden incrementar las cargas de trabajo de tripulaciones y controladores, en aras de la competitividad y del control de costes, y que desprecian la seguridad aérea como el valor máximo que puede ofrecer el servicio de transporte por avión; porque una de las causas del accidente fue el cansancio de la tripulación, consecuencia directa de la tensión y cargas de trabajo excesivas, aparte del mal momento escogido para realizar la trasnferencia en el control de la aeronave.

Es increíble la capacidad que tiene el ser humano para cerrar los ojos a la evidencia, o mirar hacia otro lado, y luego rasgarse las vestiduras exigiendo responsabilidades; porque evidentes son los riesgos que entraña la operación en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas y cínicas serán las voces que luego se alzarán pidiendo las testas de los culpables, como si ahora desconocieran quienes son, los unos y los otros.