Adjuntamos el artículo de SKYbrary sobre el accidente de un MD-82 de One Two Go Airlines, con 130 tripulantes a bordo, ocurrido en el Aeropuerto de Phuket (Tailandia) el 16 de septiembre de 2007. La aeronave tras una aproximación fallida a la pista 27 no fue capaz de remontar y se estrelló contra el suelo dentro del perímetro del recinto aeroportuario, con un balance final de 90 muertos, 26 heridos graves y 14 leves.
Adjuntamos también la noticia publicada en El Mundo y un vídeo sobre el accidente.
MD82, Phuket Thailand, 2007 (LOC HF)
Source: www.skybrary.aero
Category: Accidents and Incidents
Description
On 16 September 2007, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 being operated by One Two Go Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Bangkok to Phuket attempted a missed approach from close to runway 27 in day VMC but only climbed briefly before a steep descent into the ground occurred within the airport perimeter. The impact and subsequent fire led to the destruction of the aircraft and to the deaths of 90 of the 130 occupants, serious injury to 26 others and minor injuries to the other 14.
Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the AAIC of Thailand with significant assistance from the NTSB. The DFDR and CVR were recovered and successfully replayed and the non-volatile memory (NVM) from various equipment, including especially the EGPWS unit, also yielded important information.
It was established that the aircraft commander, an Indonesian National, had taken the role of PM for the flight with the First Officer, a much younger Thai National acting as PF. There was a very considerable disparity between the level of both the overall flying experience and the specific aircraft type experience of the two pilots. The First Officer, whilst having been operating on the MD82 for some time, had gained most if not all of his multi crew jet experience on the type.
It was established that the ILS approach in VMC had been made with the AP out but the A/T (autothrottle) engaged in conditions which clearly indicated that a temporary deterioration in the weather was imminent and which had included awareness of the preceding inbound aircraft reporting that there “was a Cb over the airport”. Nevertheless, the aircraft commander had allowed the First Officer to remain as PF and even when it became apparent that he was not able to achieve a stabilised approach as the wind velocity and variation increased, did not take control. Eventually, as the auto call out of 40 feet height occurred, an EGPWS Mode 1 Sink Rate Alert was annunciated and the First Officer called a go around. This was confirmed by the commander and the First Officer called for Flap 15 and manually pushed the thrust levers forward - but failed to set or call for TO/GA to be set - before ‘transferring control’ to the commander. Since the A/T was still engaged when the go around was called, retard mode had become active and since the DFDR showed that the thrust had returned to idle after the initial manual override by the First Officer, it was surmised that when control was passed to the commander without prior warning, the First Officer had removed his hand from the thrust levers and the commander was initially using both his hands on the control column. All other go around actions were completed including the necessary pitch up but at no subsequent stage was the TO/GA switch pressed. The aircraft reached a height of almost 300 feet aal before it ceased to climb as a consequence of lack of engine thrust. Further EGPWS alerts and a final PULL UP warning were found to have occurred in the descent shortly before impact, upon which a fire immediately broke out. Four minutes after the impact, the weather had deteriorated further to 800 metres visibility in heavy rain and conditions below landing minima. It was noted that the aircraft had been fitted with a reactive wind shear alerting system which it was established had been serviceable, but no activation of it had occurred until the final second prior to impact.
It was noted that there was no provision in the Operations Manual for a handover of control at the point of go around and considered that confusion about system status would have been exacerbated by this sudden and unplanned / unanticipated handover. It was considered that the aircraft commander could reasonably have taken control at a much earlier stage of the approach and/or called an earlier go around. The Investigation also noted general non compliance with SOPs by the accident aircraft flight crew (although no conflict between them) as well as considerable deficiencies in practices of the aircraft operator. It was also found that both accident flight crew had exceeded various elements of the applicable flight time limitations scheme, although no hard evidence that either was fatigued as a consequence of this in a way that affected the accident outcome was presented by the Investigation.
In respect of the Airport, the effective but non notified unserviceability of the LLWAS due to it being powered by solar cells which had run down after a period of cloudy weather was noted. Aspects of the emergency response were also considered unsatisfactory.
The Commission determined the Probable Causes of the Accident to be as follows:
• The flight crew did not follow the SOPs (for) Stabilised Approach, Call Out, Go Around and Emergency Situations as specified in the airline’s FOM
• The Take Off / Go Around (TO/GA) switch was not activated, resulting in the inability of the aircraft to increase in airspeed and altitude during the go around. Also, there was no monitoring of the change in engine power and movement of throttle levers, especially during the critical situation.
• The flight crew co-ordination was insufficient and the flight crew had heavy workloads.
• The weather condition changed suddenly over the airport vicinity
• The flight crew had accumulated stress, insufficient rest and fatigue
•The transfer of aircraft control took place at a critical moment during the go around
A total of 17 Safety Recommendations were issued as a result of the Investigation as follows:
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish (a) Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) course, approved by the DCA, for all related personnel in every concerned section. The course should comprise of initial and recurrent training, having content according to ICAO requirements.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should strictly train flight crew according to the flight crew training course and flight procedures in SOP.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should amend the Operating Procedures on ‘Transfer of Control during Critical Phase of Flight’ in SOP to be most clear and definite.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should perform the pilot training check, as appointed by the DCA, to meet applicable standards, especially the pilot proficiency check.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should use a flight simulator that (can) simulate the systems, equipment and instruments of the aeroplane with the same configuration (that) the Airline operates.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should arrange the crew schedule, according to the requirements in Flight Time and Flight Duty Period Limitations, by establishing a checking system with advance warning function before exceeding the limitation. The system should also enable the flight crew to check their status.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk leading to any accident or incident and to improve the safety of flight operations to meet the required standards.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should direct all management levels to encourage personnel to have unique corporate culture in having values and beliefs to perform their jobs, in accordance with laws and regulations, and to report any wrongful misconduct (which) may (be) of use for improving task efficiency and increasing safety performance. This could be done through training and motivation.
• that the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should expedite the improvement of (the) runway strip to meet the Standard prescribed in Annex 14 of ICAO or revise the category of instrument approach procedure to suit the current runway strip. The Company shall also establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should construct more access roads across the ditch along runway 27 to inaccessible areas at Phuket International Airport to facilitate rescue and fire fighting team (access) to any accident area in due time. The Company should also arrange the rescue and fire fighting exercise in those areas in order to mitigate the difficulties in rescue and fire fighting.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should include the Emergency Medical Institute of Thailand (formerly Narenthorn Centre), which is the government institute that co-ordinate(s) and provide(s) medical emergency service, in the Airport Emergency Plan.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should perform a full scale emergency exercise which should cover the participation of all responsible sectors and personnel to comply with the Airport Emergency Plan in (the) most efficient way when an accident (occurs).
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should oversee the operation of One Two Go Airlines Company Limited….in order to improve their safety efficiency. The DCA should also issue regulations indicating the guidelines and practices of CRM training.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should improve the measure for regulating and overseeing the air operators under DCA supervision to achieve the most efficiency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Aero Thai Company Limited in order to specify operational guidelines (for) ‘Crash on Airport’ into (the) ‘Manual of Air Traffic Services. The guidelines should also be detailed in accordance with Doc 9137/An 898 Airport Service Manual, Part 7: Airport Emergency Planning, Chapter 4, Responsibility and Role of Each Type of Emergency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Meteorological Department to review all LLWAS installation(s) to identify possible deficiencies I performance, similar to those identified at Phuket International Airport and correct such deficiencies to ensure optimum performance of the LLWAS. Furthermore, the DCA should consider the installation of efficient LLWAS with advance system(s) to cover other airports, as considered necessary.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the following medical centres that perform post accident medical examinations on involved flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform physical examination on surviving post accident flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination by physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health and/or physicians from the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police arrive at the accident site first.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health.
o The Ministry of Public Health to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health arrive at the accident site first.
o The Ministry of Public Health to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.
The Final Report of the Investigation was published in June 2010.
Related articles and further readings were not included but are available in the skybrary article.
¿Cuáles serían las consecuencias de un accidente de estas características en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas?
Catastróficas. Lo vemos en los siguientes Riesgos de Barajas:
RIESGO 2
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 33L en categorías ILS II y III, según operaciones publicadas en el AIP en la actualidad, es susceptible de impactar contra la terminal T4.
RIESGO 3
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en ILS CATII y III, es susceptible de impactar contra la Torre de Control Norte que invade sus OAS de frustrada, al haberla ubicado a escasos 400 metros, cuando precisamente por este motivo la pista 33R se tuvo que desplazar y distanciar de la 33L 1900 metros, a fin de cumplir con la distancia legal de seguridad de 950 metros equidistantes que sí existen para la 33R y 33L.
RIESGO 4
Los embudos o espacios de Seguridad establecidos para los aterrizajes frustrados por las pistas 33R y 33L en categoría ILS II y III, que deberían permanecer libres de objetos para cumplir su función de seguridad, son sistemáticamente invadidos por las aeronaves que despegan desde las pistas 36R y 36L con el riesgo de colisión, precisamente por no cumplir la Normativa del Anexo 14 de OACI de operar en PISTAS PARALELAS O CASI PARALELAS. Esta situación es contemplada para cuando Barajas opera en configuración Norte y vuelve a reproducirse exactamente igual cuando se opera en configuración Sur.
RIESGO 5
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en categorías ILS II y III está sujeto a riesgo de accidente provocado por una frustrada fallida (al igual que lo han previsto para la T4) por colisión contra los depósitos de combustible CLH, las terminales T1, T2 y T3 y el pueblo de Barajas, que se encuentran ubicados en la zona de seguridad (OFA extended) y dentro de la franja de protección de 3.500 metros recomendada por la Universidad de Cranfield.
Este accidente debería servir también de advertencia a todos aquellos que piden incrementar las cargas de trabajo de tripulaciones y controladores, en aras de la competitividad y del control de costes, y que desprecian la seguridad aérea como el valor máximo que puede ofrecer el servicio de transporte por avión; porque una de las causas del accidente fue el cansancio de la tripulación, consecuencia directa de la tensión y cargas de trabajo excesivas, aparte del mal momento escogido para realizar la trasnferencia en el control de la aeronave.
Es increíble la capacidad que tiene el ser humano para cerrar los ojos a la evidencia, o mirar hacia otro lado, y luego rasgarse las vestiduras exigiendo responsabilidades; porque evidentes son los riesgos que entraña la operación en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas y cínicas serán las voces que luego se alzarán pidiendo las testas de los culpables, como si ahora desconocieran quienes son, los unos y los otros.
Adjuntamos también la noticia publicada en El Mundo y un vídeo sobre el accidente.
MD82, Phuket Thailand, 2007 (LOC HF)
Source: www.skybrary.aero
Category: Accidents and Incidents
Description
On 16 September 2007, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 being operated by One Two Go Airlines on a scheduled passenger flight from Bangkok to Phuket attempted a missed approach from close to runway 27 in day VMC but only climbed briefly before a steep descent into the ground occurred within the airport perimeter. The impact and subsequent fire led to the destruction of the aircraft and to the deaths of 90 of the 130 occupants, serious injury to 26 others and minor injuries to the other 14.
Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the AAIC of Thailand with significant assistance from the NTSB. The DFDR and CVR were recovered and successfully replayed and the non-volatile memory (NVM) from various equipment, including especially the EGPWS unit, also yielded important information.
It was established that the aircraft commander, an Indonesian National, had taken the role of PM for the flight with the First Officer, a much younger Thai National acting as PF. There was a very considerable disparity between the level of both the overall flying experience and the specific aircraft type experience of the two pilots. The First Officer, whilst having been operating on the MD82 for some time, had gained most if not all of his multi crew jet experience on the type.
It was established that the ILS approach in VMC had been made with the AP out but the A/T (autothrottle) engaged in conditions which clearly indicated that a temporary deterioration in the weather was imminent and which had included awareness of the preceding inbound aircraft reporting that there “was a Cb over the airport”. Nevertheless, the aircraft commander had allowed the First Officer to remain as PF and even when it became apparent that he was not able to achieve a stabilised approach as the wind velocity and variation increased, did not take control. Eventually, as the auto call out of 40 feet height occurred, an EGPWS Mode 1 Sink Rate Alert was annunciated and the First Officer called a go around. This was confirmed by the commander and the First Officer called for Flap 15 and manually pushed the thrust levers forward - but failed to set or call for TO/GA to be set - before ‘transferring control’ to the commander. Since the A/T was still engaged when the go around was called, retard mode had become active and since the DFDR showed that the thrust had returned to idle after the initial manual override by the First Officer, it was surmised that when control was passed to the commander without prior warning, the First Officer had removed his hand from the thrust levers and the commander was initially using both his hands on the control column. All other go around actions were completed including the necessary pitch up but at no subsequent stage was the TO/GA switch pressed. The aircraft reached a height of almost 300 feet aal before it ceased to climb as a consequence of lack of engine thrust. Further EGPWS alerts and a final PULL UP warning were found to have occurred in the descent shortly before impact, upon which a fire immediately broke out. Four minutes after the impact, the weather had deteriorated further to 800 metres visibility in heavy rain and conditions below landing minima. It was noted that the aircraft had been fitted with a reactive wind shear alerting system which it was established had been serviceable, but no activation of it had occurred until the final second prior to impact.
It was noted that there was no provision in the Operations Manual for a handover of control at the point of go around and considered that confusion about system status would have been exacerbated by this sudden and unplanned / unanticipated handover. It was considered that the aircraft commander could reasonably have taken control at a much earlier stage of the approach and/or called an earlier go around. The Investigation also noted general non compliance with SOPs by the accident aircraft flight crew (although no conflict between them) as well as considerable deficiencies in practices of the aircraft operator. It was also found that both accident flight crew had exceeded various elements of the applicable flight time limitations scheme, although no hard evidence that either was fatigued as a consequence of this in a way that affected the accident outcome was presented by the Investigation.
In respect of the Airport, the effective but non notified unserviceability of the LLWAS due to it being powered by solar cells which had run down after a period of cloudy weather was noted. Aspects of the emergency response were also considered unsatisfactory.
The Commission determined the Probable Causes of the Accident to be as follows:
• The flight crew did not follow the SOPs (for) Stabilised Approach, Call Out, Go Around and Emergency Situations as specified in the airline’s FOM
• The Take Off / Go Around (TO/GA) switch was not activated, resulting in the inability of the aircraft to increase in airspeed and altitude during the go around. Also, there was no monitoring of the change in engine power and movement of throttle levers, especially during the critical situation.
• The flight crew co-ordination was insufficient and the flight crew had heavy workloads.
• The weather condition changed suddenly over the airport vicinity
• The flight crew had accumulated stress, insufficient rest and fatigue
•The transfer of aircraft control took place at a critical moment during the go around
A total of 17 Safety Recommendations were issued as a result of the Investigation as follows:
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish (a) Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) course, approved by the DCA, for all related personnel in every concerned section. The course should comprise of initial and recurrent training, having content according to ICAO requirements.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should strictly train flight crew according to the flight crew training course and flight procedures in SOP.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should amend the Operating Procedures on ‘Transfer of Control during Critical Phase of Flight’ in SOP to be most clear and definite.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should perform the pilot training check, as appointed by the DCA, to meet applicable standards, especially the pilot proficiency check.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should use a flight simulator that (can) simulate the systems, equipment and instruments of the aeroplane with the same configuration (that) the Airline operates.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should arrange the crew schedule, according to the requirements in Flight Time and Flight Duty Period Limitations, by establishing a checking system with advance warning function before exceeding the limitation. The system should also enable the flight crew to check their status.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk leading to any accident or incident and to improve the safety of flight operations to meet the required standards.
• that One Two Go Airlines Company should direct all management levels to encourage personnel to have unique corporate culture in having values and beliefs to perform their jobs, in accordance with laws and regulations, and to report any wrongful misconduct (which) may (be) of use for improving task efficiency and increasing safety performance. This could be done through training and motivation.
• that the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should expedite the improvement of (the) runway strip to meet the Standard prescribed in Annex 14 of ICAO or revise the category of instrument approach procedure to suit the current runway strip. The Company shall also establish a Safety Management System (SMS) in order to identify and mitigate the risk.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should construct more access roads across the ditch along runway 27 to inaccessible areas at Phuket International Airport to facilitate rescue and fire fighting team (access) to any accident area in due time. The Company should also arrange the rescue and fire fighting exercise in those areas in order to mitigate the difficulties in rescue and fire fighting.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should include the Emergency Medical Institute of Thailand (formerly Narenthorn Centre), which is the government institute that co-ordinate(s) and provide(s) medical emergency service, in the Airport Emergency Plan.
• that in respect of Rescue and Fire Fighting the Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited should perform a full scale emergency exercise which should cover the participation of all responsible sectors and personnel to comply with the Airport Emergency Plan in (the) most efficient way when an accident (occurs).
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should oversee the operation of One Two Go Airlines Company Limited….in order to improve their safety efficiency. The DCA should also issue regulations indicating the guidelines and practices of CRM training.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should improve the measure for regulating and overseeing the air operators under DCA supervision to achieve the most efficiency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Aero Thai Company Limited in order to specify operational guidelines (for) ‘Crash on Airport’ into (the) ‘Manual of Air Traffic Services. The guidelines should also be detailed in accordance with Doc 9137/An 898 Airport Service Manual, Part 7: Airport Emergency Planning, Chapter 4, Responsibility and Role of Each Type of Emergency.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the Meteorological Department to review all LLWAS installation(s) to identify possible deficiencies I performance, similar to those identified at Phuket International Airport and correct such deficiencies to ensure optimum performance of the LLWAS. Furthermore, the DCA should consider the installation of efficient LLWAS with advance system(s) to cover other airports, as considered necessary.
• that the Department of Civil Aviation of Thailand should coordinate with the following medical centres that perform post accident medical examinations on involved flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform physical examination on surviving post accident flight crew.
o The Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination by physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health and/or physicians from the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police arrive at the accident site first.
o The Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health.
o The Ministry of Public Health to collect and send samples of autopsy to the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF for further laboratory examination, in case(s) where physicians from (the) Ministry of Public Health arrive at the accident site first.
o The Ministry of Public Health to perform an autopsy and collect samples for laboratory examination with the Institute of Aviation Medicine, RTAF and / or the Institute of Forensic Medicine, Royal Thai Police.
The Final Report of the Investigation was published in June 2010.
Related articles and further readings were not included but are available in the skybrary article.
¿Cuáles serían las consecuencias de un accidente de estas características en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas?
Catastróficas. Lo vemos en los siguientes Riesgos de Barajas:
RIESGO 2
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 33L en categorías ILS II y III, según operaciones publicadas en el AIP en la actualidad, es susceptible de impactar contra la terminal T4.
RIESGO 3
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en ILS CATII y III, es susceptible de impactar contra la Torre de Control Norte que invade sus OAS de frustrada, al haberla ubicado a escasos 400 metros, cuando precisamente por este motivo la pista 33R se tuvo que desplazar y distanciar de la 33L 1900 metros, a fin de cumplir con la distancia legal de seguridad de 950 metros equidistantes que sí existen para la 33R y 33L.
RIESGO 4
Los embudos o espacios de Seguridad establecidos para los aterrizajes frustrados por las pistas 33R y 33L en categoría ILS II y III, que deberían permanecer libres de objetos para cumplir su función de seguridad, son sistemáticamente invadidos por las aeronaves que despegan desde las pistas 36R y 36L con el riesgo de colisión, precisamente por no cumplir la Normativa del Anexo 14 de OACI de operar en PISTAS PARALELAS O CASI PARALELAS. Esta situación es contemplada para cuando Barajas opera en configuración Norte y vuelve a reproducirse exactamente igual cuando se opera en configuración Sur.
RIESGO 5
El aterrizaje frustrado por la pista 18R en categorías ILS II y III está sujeto a riesgo de accidente provocado por una frustrada fallida (al igual que lo han previsto para la T4) por colisión contra los depósitos de combustible CLH, las terminales T1, T2 y T3 y el pueblo de Barajas, que se encuentran ubicados en la zona de seguridad (OFA extended) y dentro de la franja de protección de 3.500 metros recomendada por la Universidad de Cranfield.
Este accidente debería servir también de advertencia a todos aquellos que piden incrementar las cargas de trabajo de tripulaciones y controladores, en aras de la competitividad y del control de costes, y que desprecian la seguridad aérea como el valor máximo que puede ofrecer el servicio de transporte por avión; porque una de las causas del accidente fue el cansancio de la tripulación, consecuencia directa de la tensión y cargas de trabajo excesivas, aparte del mal momento escogido para realizar la trasnferencia en el control de la aeronave.
Es increíble la capacidad que tiene el ser humano para cerrar los ojos a la evidencia, o mirar hacia otro lado, y luego rasgarse las vestiduras exigiendo responsabilidades; porque evidentes son los riesgos que entraña la operación en el Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas y cínicas serán las voces que luego se alzarán pidiendo las testas de los culpables, como si ahora desconocieran quienes son, los unos y los otros.
1 comentario:
Magnifico articulazo, que se podría escribir con letras más grande, pero más claro imposible..., ¡ENHOABUENA!
Yo además le añado a esta pontencial catástrofe que planea sobre Barajas y sus poblaciones colindantes, que un aterrizaje frustrado en cualquiera de esas cuatro "semi-pistas" de Barajas únicas en el mundo, 32L, 32R, 18L y 18R, la magnitud de la catástrofe por el numero de fallecidos que en cualquier momento se pueden producir puede ser apocalíptico, si tenemos en cuenta que las bocas de entrada al tunel subterraneo de la autopista que une Barajas pueblo con Pracuellos del Jarama los han situados en lo que serían el área de las cuatro RPZ,s (Runway Prtection Zone) correspondientes a lo que serían las cuatro Pistas que AENA solo permite que se utilicen como "Semi-Pistas", a las cuatro les mantiene cerradas a cal y canto la función de despegue, y en tres de ellas, las recientemente construidas, aún no se han estrenado, se podrían llenar de combustible evidentemente ardiendo.
Aclaro para el que no sea un profesional en este tema, a la vista del RIESGO 3, que supone el que la Torre de Control de manera algo más que terrorífica (caso único en el mundo) este invadiendo las OAS de las Aproximaciones de Frustrada de la Pista 18R, al haberla ubicado con premeditación alevosía y nocturnidad a tan solo 1310 metros de su paralela 18L, a sabiendas de que las distancia mínima es de 1,800 metros, la definición en el Reglamento de Circulación Aérea, de los que significa las siglas OAS
"OAS.- Superficies de Evaluación de Obstáculos"
Luis Guil
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